If you’re struggling to outsmart multiple-choice bar exam questions…
If you never want to shut your eyes, cross your fingers, and blindly choose “(C)” because you’re totally stumped…
And if you don’t want to take a chance on what’s quite possibly the most important test in your life…
Then you’re studying for the MBE with dedication, energy, and rigor.
Be sure to explore the BarMD shop for California Bar and UBE courses + resources, including MBE DNA, our revolutionary MBE program that includes hardcopy flashcards (and goes way beyond), as well as our Performance Test Course.
The BarMD experts provided these free MBE sample questions for you.
See how many you get right today!
Example of Civil Procedure MBE Questions
Here’s a real sample from our MBE program (which now comes with our flagship CA Bar Exam Course for free).
Take a close look, and see how you do:
An entrepreneur from State A decided to sell hot sauce to the public, labeling it “Best Hot Sauce.”
A company incorporated in State B and headquartered in State C sued the entrepreneur in federal court in State C. The complaint sought $50,000 in damages and alleged that the entrepreneur’s use of the name “Best Hot Sauce” infringed the company’s federal trademark. The entrepreneur filed an answer denying the allegations, and the parties began discovery. Six months later, the entrepreneur moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Should the court grant the entrepreneur’s motion?
(A) No, because the company’s claim arises under federal law.
(B) No, because the entrepreneur waived the right to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction by not raising the issue initially by motion or in the answer.
(C) Yes, because although the claim arises under federal law, the amount in controversy is not satisfied.
(D) Yes, because although there is diversity, the amount in controversy is not satisfied.
Think you’ve got the answer? We’ve placed a photo after each question so you can test yourself before the big reveal.
Scroll down to see if you got it right!
(A) No, because the company’s claim arises under federal law.
Correct. The claim asserts federal trademark infringement, and therefore it arises under federal law. Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a general federal-question action. That statute requires no minimum amount in controversy, so the amount the company seeks is irrelevant.
(B) No, because the entrepreneur waived the right to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction by not raising the issue initially by motion or in the answer.
Incorrect. Under Federal Rule 12(h)(3), subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and the court can determine at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the fact that the entrepreneur delayed six months before raising the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is immaterial and the court will not deny his motion on that basis.
(C) Yes, because although the claim arises under federal law, the amount in controversy is not satisfied.
Incorrect. There is no amount-in-controversy requirement for actions that arise under federal law.
(D) Yes, because although there is diversity, the amount in controversy is not satisfied.
Incorrect. Although diversity jurisdiction requires an amount in controversy of $75,000 or more, when diverse parties are litigating a federal claim, the action is treated for jurisdictional purposes as a federal-question action, not a diversity action. The claim here asserts federal trademark infringement and therefore it arises under federal law. The fact that the action does not meet all the requirements for diversity jurisdiction is irrelevant.
Example of Torts MBE Questions
Try your hand at an MBE practice question on tort law:
A driver, returning home from a long work shift at a factory, fell asleep at the wheel and lost control of his car. As a result, his car collided with a police car driven by an officer who was returning to the station after having responded to an emergency. The officer was injured in the accident and later sued the driver in negligence for her injuries. The driver has moved for summary judgment, arguing that the common law firefighters’ rule bars the suit.
Should the court grant the motion?
(A) No, because the firefighters’ rule does not apply to police officers.
(B) No, because the police officer’s injuries were not related to any special dangers of her job.
(C) Yes, because the accident would not have occurred but for the emergency.
(D) Yes, because the police officer was injured on the job.
Got your answer?
Keep scrolling to see if your logic holds up!
(A) No, because the firefighters’ rule does not apply to police officers.
Incorrect. This answer correctly states that the driver’s motion should be denied, but it misstates the legal basis for this conclusion. The firefighters’ rule, although named with reference to firefighters, also covers police officers. They, too, are public servants at risk of injury by the perils that they have been employed to confront. Instead, the motion should be denied because being struck by a car in normal traffic is not one of the special risks inherent to dangerous police work. The firefighters’ rule bars only claims for injuries that result from risks that are unique or special to the plaintiff’s inherently dangerous work.
(B) No, because the police officer’s injuries were not related to any special dangers of her job.
Correct. The driver could be held liable for his negligence because being struck by a car in normal traffic is not one of the special risks inherent to dangerous police work. The firefighters’ rule bars only claims for injuries that result from risks that are unique or special to the plaintiff’s inherently dangerous work.
(C) Yes, because the accident would not have occurred but for the emergency.
Incorrect. But-for causation is not sufficient to support the firefighters’ rule defense when the risk that materialized was not one of the unique risks inherent to the officer’s dangerous work. The firefighters’ rule bars only claims for injuries that result from risks that are unique or special to the plaintiff’s inherently dangerous work. The fact that the officer was returning from an emergency when she was struck is just a coincidence.
(D) Yes, because the police officer was injured on the job.
Incorrect. The firefighters’ rule bars only claims for injuries that result from risks that are unique or special to the plaintiff’s inherently dangerous work. Workers’ compensation, not the common law of torts, is the compensation system for on-the-job injuries. The driver could be held liable for his negligence because being struck by a car in normal traffic is not one of the special risks inherent to dangerous police work.
Example of Constitutional Law MBE Questions
How well do you know the implications of the 7 articles and 23 amendments?
Give this next MBE sample question a shot:
A federal statute imposes an excise tax of $100 on each new computer sold in the United States. It also appropriates the entire proceeds of that tax to a special fund, which is required to be used to purchase licenses for computer software that will be made available for use, free of charge, to any resident of the United States.
Is this statute constitutional?
(A) No, because the federal government may not impose any direct taxes on citizens of the United States.
(B) No, because the statute takes, without just compensation, the property of persons who hold patents or copyrights on computer software.
(C) Yes, because it is a reasonable exercise of Congress’s powers to tax and spend for the general welfare.
(D) Yes, because the patent power authorizes Congress to impose reasonable charges on the sale of technology and to spend the proceeds of those charges to advance the use of technology in the United States.
Do you think you selected the correct answer?
Scroll down to see how you did.
(A) No, because the federal government may not impose any direct taxes on citizens of the United States.
Incorrect. Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution allows Congress to adopt direct taxes, provided they are in proportion to the national census. Courts defer to reasonable congressional taxing measures, such as the statute at issue, as well as to expenditures that reasonably further the general welfare.
(B) No, because the statute takes, without just compensation, the property of persons who hold patents or copyrights on computer software.
Incorrect. It is true that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. But the statute effects no such taking. A tax on the sale of a computer takes no property from those who hold patents or copyrights on computer software. Likewise, the software to be distributed freely under the statute will be purchased, rather than taken, by the government. Courts defer to reasonable congressional taxing measures, such as the statute at issue, as well as to expenditures that reasonably further the general welfare.
(C) Yes, because it is a reasonable exercise of Congress’s powers to tax and spend for the general welfare.
Correct. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution gives Congress broad power to tax and to spend for the general welfare. Courts defer to reasonable congressional taxing measures, such as the statute at issue, as well as to expenditures that reasonably further the general welfare.
(D) Yes, because the patent power authorizes Congress to impose reasonable charges on the sale of technology and to spend the proceeds of those charges to advance the use of technology in the United States.
Incorrect. Although Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution gives Congress power to provide patent rights to inventors, this clause does not itself authorize federal taxes and appropriations. Courts defer to reasonable congressional taxing measures, such as the statute at issue, as well as to expenditures that reasonably further the general welfare.
Example of Contract MBE Questions
Are you confident about contracts and sales? This next question will test your skills:
In January, a teacher contracted with a summer camp to serve as its head counselor at a salary of $10,000 for 10 weeks, from the first of June to the middle of August. In March, the camp notified the teacher that it had hired someone else as head counselor and that the teacher’s services would not be needed. In April, the teacher spent $200 traveling to interview at the only other nearby summer camp for a position as its head counselor. The teacher was not chosen for that job. The teacher then took a position teaching in a local summer school at a salary of $6,000 for the same 10-week period.
How much is the teacher entitled to recover as damages in a breach-of-contract action against the camp?
(A) $4,000.
(B) $4,200.
(C) $10,000.
(D) $10,200.
Got your choice?
Scroll past the photo to see the answer.
(A) $4,000.
Incorrect. The goal is to put the teacher in the position he would have occupied but for the breach. $4,000 is a wrong answer because it fails to provide for recovery of the $200 expense the teacher incurred in the reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, effort to mitigate damages by applying for the head counselor position at the other summer camp. The fact that the effort to mitigate was unsuccessful does not mean that the expense is not recoverable. Accordingly, the teacher is entitled to recover the difference between the contract salary ($10,000) and the amount earned at the local summer school ($6,000), plus the reasonable expenses incurred in seeking to mitigate after the breach ($200 in travel expenses).
(B) $4,200.
Correct. The teacher is entitled to be put in the position he would have been in if the contract had been performed. Application of this principle leads to recovery of the difference between the contract salary ($10,000) and the amount earned at the local summer school ($6,000), plus the reasonable expenses incurred in seeking to mitigate after the breach ($200 in travel expenses). Mitigation expenses can be recovered, if reasonable, even if those particular expenses are not connected to a successful mitigation attempt.
(C) $10,000.
Incorrect. The goal is to put the teacher in the position he would have occupied but for the breach. An award of $10,000 would overcompensate the teacher, violating the principle of expectation damages. The teacher successfully sought other employment for the same time period as covered in the contract, and the amount earned on that job must be taken into account in calculating damages. There is no suggestion here that the teacher could have held both jobs simultaneously, earning both salaries. In addition, this answer fails to compensate the teacher for the travel expenses incurred in mitigating damages. The fact that the effort to mitigate was unsuccessful does not mean that the expense is not recoverable. The proper recovery is the difference between the contract salary ($10,000) and the amount earned at the local summer school ($6,000), plus the reasonable expenses incurred in seeking to mitigate after the breach ($200 in travel expenses).
(D) $10,200.
Incorrect. The goal is to put the teacher in the position he would have occupied but for the breach. An award of $10,200 would overcompensate the teacher, violating the principle of expectation damages. The teacher successfully sought other employment for the same time period as covered in the contract, and the amount earned on that job must be taken into account in calculating damages. There is no suggestion here that the teacher could have held both jobs simultaneously, earning both salaries. This answer does take into account the unsuccessful effort to mitigate damages, which is appropriate. Accordingly, the proper recovery is the difference between the contract salary ($10,000) and the amount earned at the local summer school ($6,000), plus the reasonable expenses incurred in seeking to mitigate after the breach ($200 in travel expenses).
Example of Evidence MBE Questions
When you encounter an evidence question, are you ready to take it on?
See how this one goes:
A homeowner sued a plumber for damages resulting from the plumber’s allegedly faulty installation of water pipes in her basement, which caused flooding. At trial, the homeowner is prepared to testify that when she first detected the flooding, she turned off the water and called the plumber at his emergency number for help and that the plumber responded, “I’ll come by tomorrow and redo the installation for free.”
Is the homeowner’s testimony regarding the plumber’s response admissible?
(A) No, because the statement was an offer in compromise.
(B) No, because it is hearsay not within any exception.
(C) Yes, as a subsequent remedial measure.
(D) Yes, as evidence of the plumber’s fault.
Let’s see if you got it correct!
(A) No, because the statement was an offer in compromise.
Incorrect. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 protects statements concerning a claim that is disputed as to validity or amount. However, in this case there was no pending dispute at the time the statement was made. The homeowner was simply calling for help and had not complained about the plumber’s work or in any other way indicated that there was a dispute between the parties. Accordingly, the statement does not qualify as an offer in compromise.
(B) No, because it is hearsay not within any exception.
Incorrect. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) exempts a party’s statements, when used against that party, from the definition of hearsay. In this case, the plumber is a party and the statement is being offered against him. In this context, the statement is not hearsay.
(C) Yes, as a subsequent remedial measure.
Incorrect. This answer correctly states that the plumber’s response is admissible, but it misstates the reasoning for this conclusion. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 excludes evidence of measures taken that, had they been taken prior to the event that caused the injury, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur. Here, no “measure” was taken at all. The homeowner wants to introduce a statement, not any action that would have made the injury less likely to occur. Therefore Rule 407 is inapplicable.
(D) Yes, as evidence of the plumber’s fault.
Correct. This is a party admission, admissible as a hearsay exemption under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). A statement made by a party cannot be excluded as hearsay when offered against him by the opponent. Moreover, the statement is probative. A person who makes a statement like this is likely to think he is at fault, and this statement is probative evidence that indeed he was at fault.
Unlock the Secrets to the MBE With Our Program
Meet BarMD’s MBE DNA program—an online course that trains you to tackle any MBE question.
MBE DNA includes hardcopy flashcards, over 1,500 MBE questions, supplemental decoding strategies, and access to an exclusive portal with BarMD’s training videos.
You also get BarMD’s exclusive MBE Journaling program—so you can learn from past mistakes, and never repeat them during exam crunch time again.
This comprehensive MBE program is also included in our flagship California Bar prep course.